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A Executive Summary 
 
The scope of related party transactions for transfer pricing purposes in the 
OECD Model Tax Convention (OECD MTC), OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
(OECD TPG) and the transfer pricing regimes of selected tax jurisdictions were 
reviewed for differences. The term “associated enterprises” in Associated Enterprises 
Article (Article 9) of the OECD MTC was intended to apply to parent and subsidiaries, 
as well as companies under common control. The original objective of Article 9 was to 
ensure the proper allocation of profits between enterprises that had common 
ownership of stock or capital. All three elements of participation in capital, 
management and control have to be present for two enterprises to be considered as 
associated for the purpose of Article 9. The interconnectedness in Article 9 may be 
found in company law which governs the relationship between the companies. 
However, mere interconnectedness is insufficient for the application of the Article, as 
it must be demonstrated that such interconnectedness leads to an ability to influence 
the transfer pricing between enterprises for Article 9 to be applied. There has to be 
management that results in control, and a qualitative assessment is required to 
determine this.  
Domestically, many jurisdictions consider control to be present if there are 
shareholding relationships, which is a fairly blunt test. How control is be determined in 
substance presents an even broader range of definitions amongst the jurisdictions 
surveyed. As tax treaties are meant to restrict the application of domestic tax rules, if 
a jurisdiction’s domestic legislation imposes profit adjustments on enterprises 
associated by definition but where there is no control, it is arguable that the jurisdiction 
is not acting in accordance with Article 9(1) of the treaty and the other contracting state 
is not obliged to provide double taxation relief under Article 9(2). In addition, it could 
be said that if a jurisdiction makes adjustments on the transactions between two 
enterprises which are not associated under the treaty, but associated under domestic 
law, Article 9 and consequently it may not be clear if the Mutual Agreement Procedure 
Article (Article 25) under paragraph 1 would be applicable. A possible solution could 
be for both contracting states to find a solution via Article 25(3) to remove economic 
double taxation. 
 There are certain practical implications arising from the differences between 
the related party definition in Article 9 of the OECD MTC compared to that in domestic 
transfer pricing legislations. For example, some joint ventures (JVs) may fall within the 
domestic definitions of related party transactions. However, based on the original 
intention and scope of Article 9(1), JVs should not be caught within the scope of 
associated enterprises. There are also ambiguities when it comes to the application of 
Article 9 and domestic transfer pricing regimes to family owned 
companies/businesses. Different definitions of related party transactions in domestic 
transfer pricing legislations could cause practical difficulties in assessing comparability 
in a transfer pricing analysis. In addition, where proxies are used to identify associated 
enterprises/related parties, such as in the case of country-by-country reporting, entities 
that may not be considered as associated to each other for the OECD or domestic tax 
purposes could be disclosed, which could lead to unnecessary complications and 
compliance costs to taxpayers. Finally, the “closely related” concept proposed under 
BEPS Action 7 could arguably bring in new factors for consideration in determining 
relatedness, as jurisdictions consider how to define the scope of related parties in their 
transfer pricing regimes. 
Therefore, there is a need to provide more clarity on the meaning of the term 
“associated enterprise” in Article 9, as it serves the objective of the elimination of 
economic double taxation and ensures that transactions between associated 
enterprises are conducted at arm’s length. Where economic double taxation results, it 
also provides the mechanism for the other jurisdiction to make adjustments and 
remove the economic double taxation. Domestic TP legislation has a broader purpose, 
which is to ensure arm’s length behaviour in both a domestic and cross border context. 
Every jurisdiction can exercise its sovereign right to set its own rules to meet its specific 
objectives. In a cross border context, the real issue would tend to arise in the context 
of parents and subsidiaries or subsidiaries in the same group, and less so of other 
types of association, e.g. by blood relations. While the domestic and international 
definitions of associated enterprises are not aligned, what matters is that countries 
interpret Article 9 and their obligation with consensus to ensure that the intended effect 
of the Article is achieved.  
 
 Given the increasing focus on transfer pricing, more transfer pricing disputes 
are expected and correspondingly a greater use of Article 9 to eliminate economic 
double taxation. This intensifies the need for clarity on the scope of Article 9. It may 
also be timely to review the scope in light of the changes that are being made to the 
OECD TPG.  
B Paper 
 
1. Introduction  
The proposed research examines the scope of what are considered as related 
party transactions falling under the OECD TPG as well as the transfer pricing regimes 
of selected tax jurisdictions.  
 
Most jurisdictions define related party transactions for transfer pricing purposes 
using the concept of “control”, but countries perceive “control” from various and 
sometimes vastly different perspectives. Some jurisdictions’ definitions of related party 
transactions have been conceptualized specifically for the purposes of their transfer 
pricing regimes, while others may have adopted the definitions used for other income 
tax or even non-tax purposes.  
 The OECD TPG does not deal with the concept of Associated Enterprises as 
used in Article 9 of the OECD MTC. Article 9 of the OECD MTC does not define the 
terms that are used in the definition of associated enterprises. This gives rise to the 
question of what exactly was intended for under the scope of Article 9 and its 
consequent applicability. 
 
The paper starts with an attempt to define the term “Associated Enterprises” and 
the scope of Article 9 of the OECD MTC. It then seeks to ascertain the various models 
used to define the scope of related party transactions in transfer pricing regimes and 
discuss the extent of such variation and its implications, including the impact on 
taxpayers. The high level implications of the differences between the international 
meaning and domestic meaning of “Associated Enterprises/related parties” are then 
discussed. The paper then discusses the practical implications arising from such 
differences in certain specific scenarios i.e. joint ventures, family owned companies, 
comparability and country-by-country reporting. The implications of the “closely 
related” concept proposed under BEPS Action 7 are also discussed. Finally, the paper 
concludes with some recommendations to resolve these issues. 
 
2. Transfer Pricing 
2.1. OECD Model Tax Convention 
Cross border trades and transactions has grown tremendously over the years. 
This is facilitated by the opening up of country borders and advent in technology. It 
becomes important that there is an international system to allocate profits across the 
jurisdictions where the activities take place in. This helps to prevent double taxation 
which impedes the exchange of goods and services, capital, technology and persons.1 
Guidance or clear rules on the allocation of international profits also help to prevent 
disputes between jurisdictions arising from the allocation of profits. 
The OECD introduced the MTC to harmonize and standardize rules for profit 
allocation and to prevent double taxation. The League of Nations commenced its work 
in 1921. This led to the first model bilateral convention in 1928 (1928 draft model), the 
Mexico model in 1943 and the London model in 1946. These models were not 
accepted by all jurisdictions.2 However, bilateral tax conventions were already entered 
into by jurisdictions to resolve double taxation conflicts between themselves. Post 
World War II, the importance of extending bilateral tax conventions to more countries 
and the need for harmonization among these conventions was recognised. Further 
work was started in 1956 to establish a model tax convention that would be acceptable 
to most jurisdictions. This resulted in the 1963 model which was adopted by the council 
                                                          
1  Introduction to the OECD Model Tax Convention 2014. 
2  The term “jurisdictions” and “states” is used interchangeably in this paper. 
of OECD. This model has been updated on a continuous basis to adapt it to changing 
economic conditions and the new ways in which cross border transactions were 
undertaken.3 This is the OECD MTC as we know it today. 
 
2.2. Associated enterprises 
In the first League of Nations draft of 1927, subsidiary companies were treated 
as permanent establishments (PEs) of their parent company. The term “affiliated 
companies” was used.4 Consequently, there was no need for the equivalent of Article 
9 of the OECD MTC as we know it today.5  
 
Over time, most jurisdictions favoured the treatment of subsidiaries as separate 
entities. These were then excluded from the PE concept.6  In the 1928 draft model, 
subsidiaries were treated as separate entities for tax purposes. The treatment of 
subsidiaries ran in parallel to PEs. The drafts were only concerned with the portion of 
profits that could be diverted from a domestic enterprise to an enterprise in the other 
contracting State.7 As there was no provision relating to the allocation of business 
income between subsidiaries and parent companies, it was recognised that 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) were at the risk of double taxation.8 Today, Article 9 
has evolved and applies to the diversion of profits of a domestic enterprise to 
enterprises in third states.9 
 
According to US economist, Thomas S Adams, the problem of allocation of 
business income is more complex than thought. The prime cases of double taxation 
resulted from the existence of international business income.10 A detailed study setting 
out rules on the allocation of income was needed and US lawyer, Mitchell B Carroll 
was appointed by the League of Nations to carry out this research.11  The term 
                                                          
3   OECD (2014), ‘Introduction – Historical background’, in Model Tax Convention on Income and 
on Capital: Condensed Version 2014, OECD Publishing. 
4  League of Nations, ‘Taxation of Foreign and National Enterprises – Methods of allocating Taxable 
Income’, Volume IV (Geneva: League of Nations Document No. 
C425(b).M.217(b).1933.II.A.,1933, at pg 109. 
5   K. Vogel, ‘Article 9 chapter’, Klaus Vogel on double taxation conventions: a commentary to the 
OECD-,UN- and US model conventions for the avoidance of double taxation on income and 
capital with particular reference to German treaty practice, Kluwer Law International 1997, Third 
edition 1997, Para 9. 
6  MB Carroll, ‘Two decades of Progress under the League of Nations’, League of Nations 
Prevention of Int double taxation and fiscal evasion, League of Nations 1939, pg. 21 and J. 
Wittendorf, Transfer Pricing and Arm’s Length Principle in International Tax Law, Kluwer L. Intl 
2010, at pg. 87. 
7  Vogel, op. cit., Article 9 chapter, Para 9. 
8  Wittendorf, op. cit., at pg. 88. 
9  Vogel, op. cit., Article 9 chapter, Para 9. 
10  M.B. Carroll, Taxation of Foreign and National enterprises, Methods of Allocating Taxable income 
vol. IV League of Nations 1933. 
11  Wittendorf, op. cit., at pg. 89. 
“associated companies” was first introduced by Carroll in his 1933 report (Carroll 
Report) for convenience purposes. We will discuss the meaning of the term 
“associated companies” as used by Carroll in section 4.2 of this paper. 
 
2.3. The arm’s length principle 
The Carroll Report recommended that the primary rule for the allocation of 
business income should be the separate accounting method. This was the first time 
Carroll referred to the arm’s length principle (ALP) i.e. the ALP is the international 
standard for the allocation of profits between jurisdictions.12 However, the ALP by itself 
was not new. The ALP has its origins in contract law. Parties which may have shared 
interests would need to arrange an agreement at ALP for it to be equitable and to 
stand up to legal scrutiny.13 In common law, the phrase “at arm’s length dealing” had 
no significance. According to some American authors, the notion of arm’s length 
dealing was related to the doctrine of “undue influence” that was developed by the 
courts of equity.14 The ALP was also used as an allocation norm in US legislation.15 It 
was implemented into the France-US tax treaty in 1932.16  
 
  Since then, the ALP has been accepted by most jurisdictions worldwide. OECD 
jurisdictions endorsed the ALP in the OECD MTC and in the 1979 report by the OECD 
to address transfer pricing and other related tax issues with respect to MNEs.17 The 
ALP is also the accepted guiding principle in the UN Model.18 Jurisdictions incorporate 
the ALP into bilateral tax treaties and coordinate the operation of the ALP 
internationally.19 More recently, the ALP was the focus of further clarification in the 
OECD and G20 countries’ Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Action Plan (BEPS Action 
Plan), particularly with regard to Actions 8, 9 and 10, although interestingly there was 
                                                          
12  MB Carroll, ‘Taxation of Foreign and National Enterprises’, Methods of Allocating Taxable Income 
vol. IV, League of Nations 1933. 
13  United Nations, United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries, 
United Nations New York 2013, Para 1.4.3. 
14  Baker, R and Baker D, “The pricing of goods in International Transactions between Controlled 
Taxpayers’, 10 Tax Executive 2.3.5 (1957-1958), pp 247-248 and R Dwarkasing, Associated 
Enterprises A concept Essential for the Application of the Arm’s Length Principle and Transfer 
Pricing, Wolf Legal Publishers, the Netherlands 2011, at pg 41. 
15  US Revenue Act 1928 sec. 45, referred to in the US national report to the League of Nations in 
1932. US regulations refer to ALP as the arm’s length standard. World Tax Journal 2015 (Vol. 7) 
No. 3 para The Arm’s Length Comparable in Transfer Pricing: A Search for an “Actual” or a 
“Hypothetical” Transaction”. 
16  Wittendorf, op. cit., at pg. 32. 
17  OECD, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, 
OECD publishing 22 July 2010, Foreword and preface. 
18  United Nations, op. cit., Para 1.4.3. 
19  World Tax Journal 2015 (Vol. 7) No. 3 para 2 The Arm’s Length Comparable in Transfer Pricing: 
A Search for an “Actual” or a “Hypothetical” Transaction”. 
mention that should the need arise, there could be special measures introduced that 
may fall beyond the arm’s length principle.20  
 
2.4. Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
While it is relatively easy to describe the ALP, it is a complex exercise to 
establish guidelines on the practical application of the ALP.21 There are also differing 
interpretations of what the ALP means in practice.22 The OECD has done continuous 
work on the ALP and transfer pricing. The first edition of the OECD TPG was issued 
in 1995. Since then, the TPG has been updated continuously to ensure its relevance.23 
OECD jurisdictions have largely followed the TPG in their domestic transfer pricing 
regulations.24 The UN has also issued the United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer 
Pricing (UN Manual) to provide similar guidance to jurisdictions. However, both sets 
of issued guidelines are only intended to help tax administrations and MNEs to apply 
the ALP and generally do not carry legal effect. Transfer pricing regimes are creatures 
of domestic law. Each jurisdiction would have to come up with their own detailed 
legislation to implement transfer pricing rules.25 That said, it is ultimately up to each 
jurisdiction to adopt an approach that works in its domestic, legal and administrative 
framework that is consistent with its treaty obligations.26 
3. Objective of TPG in applying ALP 
3.1. International aspects 
It would be useful to understand the objectives behind both the OECD TPG and 
UN Manual in applying the ALP. This would provide a better background to interpret 
the terms and concepts that are used.  
 
The OECD takes the view that tax administrations should not automatically 
assume that associated enterprises have sought to manipulate their profits. There 
could be genuine difficulties to determine accurately a market price in the absence of 
market forces or when adopting a particular commercial strategy. The OECD cautions 
against the confusion of transfer pricing consideration with that of tax fraud or tax 
avoidance. This is so even though transfer pricing policies may be used for such 
                                                          
20  OECD (2015), Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation, Actions 8-10 - 2015 Final 
Reports, Executive Summary, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD 
Publishing, Paris. 
21  United Nations, op. cit., Para 1.4.7 
22  Ibid. Para 1.4.2 and OECD op. cit., para 1 and United Nations, United Nations Model Double 
Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries, United Nations New York 
2011, Article 9. 
23  OECD, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, 
Foreword and preface. 
24  United Nations, op. cit., Para 1.3.2. 
25  Ibid, Para 1.7.2. 
26  Ibid, Para 1.7.4. 
purposes. 27 The OECD has also reviewed the OECD MTC continuously in recognition 
of the fact that tax avoidance and evasion has become more sophisticated and with 
the globalisation and liberalisation of OECD economies in the 1980s.28  
 
The UN takes a similar view as the OECD. From a UN perspective, transfer 
pricing does not necessarily involve tax avoidance. Setting prices is a normal aspect 
of an MNEs’ operations.29 Price adjustments to approximate the arm’s length 
transaction, which may arise irrespective of the contractual terms between the entities, 
should not lead to an implicit assumption of profit manipulation. Tax administrations 
should also not assume incorrectly that commercial or financial relations between 
associated enterprises, and the marketplace will always be different and at odds with 
each other.30 The UN also recognises that MNEs themselves may have an incentive 
to set an arm’s length price for their intra-group transactions so as to judge the true 
performance of their underlying entities.31  
 
In view of the above, the authors take the view that both the OECD TPG and 
UN Manual apply the ALP with the main objective of ensuring the appropriate level of 
profit allocation between associated enterprises. This view is also in line with Vogel’s 
opinion that the application of Article 9 is not conditional on the enterprise wilfully 
attempting to commit tax avoidance. Article 9 is designed with the intention to eliminate 
economic double taxation.32 This can only be achieved if profit allocation is subjected 
to a single rule that is binding on both contracting states to a treaty.33  
 
That said, the authors are conscious that the view above is taken based on 
OECD and UN materials that were written prior to the start of the BEPS Action Plan.  
The BEPS Action Plan has, as a primary focus, the need to address tax avoidance 
effectively34 and a number of its recommendations have been or are expected to be 
effected through the OECD TPG.35 The authors remain of the view that the 
fundamental objectives of the OECD TPG and UN Manual to apply the ALP for profit 
allocation purposes will be unchanged. Anti-avoidance issues that are taken up under 
BEPS are a different issue and should not be confused with this. As succinctly put by 
Vogel, for Article 9 to work, there can only be a single rule under profit allocation. This 
should not change even in the face of BEPS.  
                                                          
27  OECD, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, 
at Chp 1 para 1.2. 
28  OECD, op. cit., Introduction para 8. 
29  United Nations, op. cit., Para 1.1.7. 
30  Ibid, Para 1.4.10. 
31  Ibid, Para 1.4.11. 
32  Vogel, op. cit., Article 9 chapter, Para 7. 
33  Vogel, op. cit., Article 9 chapter, Para 17 
34  OECD (2015), Explanatory Statement, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, 
OECD. 
35  OECD, ‘OECD Council approves incorporation of BEPS amendments into the Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, 15 June 2016. 
 3.2. Domestic aspect 
Moving from the international front to the domestic front, the authors note that 
jurisdictions may have different objectives when setting up their domestic transfer 
pricing legislation to apply the ALP. While these jurisdictions may have used the OECD 
TPG and/ or UN Manual as guidance, their objective of setting up the legislation may 
go beyond that of mere profit allocation. Often, the objective of addressing tax 
avoidance may be apparent or even overtake the original objective of profit allocation.  
 
The UN has observed that some developed jurisdictions have tightened their 
transfer pricing legislation to address the issue of foreign enterprises that are active in 
their countries but paying lower taxes than comparable domestic groups. Some 
developing jurisdictions have introduced equally exhaustive transfer pricing 
regulations in their countries to keep their tax bases intact. Other developing 
jurisdictions are also recognising the need to address the challenges arising from 
transfer pricing.36  
 
 
4. Parties to which transfer pricing is applied 
4.1. Concept 
Conceptually, transfer pricing rules are concerned with determining whether 
the terms and conditions of a transaction (including the transaction itself) between 
enterprises belonging to the same group are in line with a specific standard (most 
often, the arm’s length principle). When defining the subjective scope of these rules 
(i.e. “enterprises belonging to the same group”), the notions of “related parties” or 
“associated enterprise” are often used. The former notion (i.e. “related parties”) is often 
used in domestic legislation; however, it cannot be found in the OECD/UN MTC or in 
the OECD TPG and UN Manual. The latter notion (i.e. “associated enterprise”), 
instead, is the one used by the OECD/UN MTC and in the OECD TPG and UN Manual.  
 
4.2. Associated enterprises 
In the OECD MTC and TPG, the term “associated enterprises” is used. The 
OECD TPG defines the term as follows: 
                                                          
36  United Nations, op. cit., Para 1.3.2. 
“Two enterprises are associated enterprises with respect to each other if one of the 
enterprises meets the conditions of Article 9 sub-paragraphs 1a) or 1b) of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention with respect to the other enterprise.” 37 
 
 
Article 9 of the OECD MTC is as follows: 
 
“ 
1. Where: 
a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State, 
or 
b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control 
or capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other 
Contracting State…” 
 
In the commentary to OECD MTC Article 9, with respect to the term “associated 
enterprises”, there was only a reference in parenthesis (bracket definition) to parent 
and subsidiary companies and companies under common control. There was no other 
elaboration.38 In the UN Transfer pricing manual, it was mentioned that Article 9 of the 
UN MTC applies to intra-group transactions and their acceptability for taxation 
purpose.39 
As mentioned under section 2.2, the term “associated companies” was first 
introduced by Carroll in his 1933 report for convenience. Prior to that, the term 
“affiliated companies” was used in the League of Nations reports. The term was used 
in the context of local subsidiary and parent company or other subsidiary companies 
of the parent. 40 Carrol considered the concept of associated enterprises to be a 
concept based on company law; subsidiary companies that are controlled through 
ownership of stock in a local company. 
The terms “enterprise of a contracting state” is defined in Article 3 of the OECD 
MTC. In summary, enterprise of a contracting state simply means an enterprise carried 
on by a resident of a contracting state. This is so irrespective of the legal form that the 
enterprise takes.41  Given the limited guidance available on the definition of 
“associated enterprises”, many scholars have mooted different interpretations of the 
exact definition of “associated enterprises”. Views are divided as to whether there is a 
                                                          
37  OECD, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, 
Glossary. 
38  OECD, op. cit., Commentary to Article 9 para 1. 
39  United Nations, op. cit., Para 1.4.4. 
40  League of Nations, op. cit., at pg 109. 
41  Dwarkasing, op. cit., at pg 122. 
treaty meaning for the term “associated enterprises” or if the meaning of this term 
should be drawn from domestic law in accordance with Article 3(2) of the OECD MTC. 
Dwarkasing is of the view that there is an autonomous interpretation of the term 
“associated enterprises”.42 He supported his view based on the historical evolution of 
Article 9. The notions of “control” and “controlled enterprises” originated in the early 
reports of the League of Nations in the 1920s. It went through different rounds of 
revisions through the years before culminating in today’s version of Article 9. This 
showed that there was an intended contextual meaning for the term “associated 
enterprises” within the OECD MTC.43 He further referred to reports issued by the 
OEEC in 1960 and by the OECD in 1979 which suggests that there was a broad 
understanding of the terms “associated enterprises” and “under common control” i.e. 
there is no need for further clarification.44  
Hamaekers expressed the opinion that the explanation provided in the 
commentary to OECD MTC Article 9 cannot be a proper definition. Given that the 
terms “Participation in management, control or capital” are not defined, Article 3(2) of 
the OECD MTC is triggered. This means that one would need to refer to domestic tax 
laws to interpret the meaning of “associated enterprises” and determine whether these 
meanings make sense in the context of tax treaties and the OECD model.45  
Applying the general rule of interpretation based on Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, we would argue that the term “associated 
enterprises” be read in its context and in light of its object and purpose. As such, it 
should be given a treaty meaning. For the term to enable the article to achieve its 
objective, there should be a broad basis of understanding for the term. Article 9(1) 
gives a jurisdiction the right to make upward adjustments to the profits of an enterprise 
in its jurisdiction if the profits have accrued under conditions that are not at arm’s 
length. Article 9(2) provides for the other jurisdiction to make downward adjustments 
on the amount of profits that were brought to tax under Article 9(1). This helps to 
eliminate double taxation. In a way, the mechanics is similar to the interaction of the 
distributive articles e.g. Articles 7 and 23 to avoid juridical double taxation.46 The 
jurisdiction applying Article 9(2) would have to agree to the adjustment made in Article 
9(1) before giving the corresponding relief. Article 9(2) is concerned about the amount 
of adjustment that should be given. By extension, logically, the jurisdiction giving the 
relief should also agree to the scope to which Article 9(1) has been applied. Unlike the 
interaction between the distributive articles and Article 23 where there is a rule to 
resolve conflicts in qualification, there is no rule that the jurisdiction which applies 
                                                          
42  Ibid., at pg. 263. 
43  Ibid., at Chp 5. 
44  OEEC, (Paris 25 May 1960) FC(60)157; OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Report of the OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs on Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises (Paris: OECD, 
1979), FC(60), annex E, at pg. 22, para 2. 
45  Hamaekers, H. “introduction to Transfer pricing”, Tax treatment of transfer pricing, Amsterdam 
IBFD Transfer Pricing database and loose-leaf publication 2008. 
46  Vogel, op. cit., at pg. 518. 
Article 9(2) would have to go by the scope to which the other jurisdiction had applied 
Article 9(1). 47 The commentary to Article 9(2) only says that the jurisdiction applying 
Article 9(2) is committed to making the adjustment only if it considers that the 
adjustment made by the other jurisdiction is justified both in principle and as regards 
the amount.48 Consequently, this would imply that there should be consensus of sorts 
on the meaning of the term “associated enterprises”. In a bilateral context, if there is 
no such consensus and each jurisdiction were to apply its domestic law meaning to 
the term “associated enterprises” and make adjustments, this would reduce the 
effectiveness of Article 9 and result in unrelieved potential economic double taxation.  
A jurisdiction could take the view that the jurisdiction making the primary adjustment 
was not acting in accordance with Article 9(1) and refuse to give relief under Article 
9(2). Alternatively, a jurisdiction could take the same view but give relief under Article 
9(2) to the extent that it believed was reasonable. In both instances, more likely than 
not, some extent of economic double taxation would remain. 
On the basis that there is a treaty meaning to the term “associated enterprises”, 
this section provides a deeper analysis of the specific meaning of the term. 
 
Article 9(1)(a) uses the term “enterprise” and “enterprise of a Contracting State” 
while Article 9(1)(b) uses the term “persons”. All three terms are defined in Article 3 of 
the OECD MTC. As explained in section 4.2 above, the terms “enterprise” and 
“enterprise of a Contracting State” simply refer to the carrying on of any business by 
a person, regardless of the legal form that it takes. While the use of the term “persons” 
in Article 9(1)(b) might appear to be broader than the term “enterprise of a contracting 
state” as used in Article 9(1)(a), Article 9(1)(b) is limited by Article 9(1)(a) by the 
qualification that these “persons” should be the same as that mentioned in Article 
9(1)(a). Consequently, these persons should also be carrying on a business.49 By 
definition, this seems to suggest that passive common shareholders in enterprises of 
both contracting states might not be covered under the scope of Article 9. The fact that 
the OECD uses the term “persons” instead of “person” should not have a significant 
impact on the scope of the Article. There should be no difference in terms of 
participation by the same “person” or “persons”.50   
  
Both Vogel and Dwarkasing support the view that Article 9 only deals with profit 
adjustment between enterprises., Specifically, Vogel is of the view that direct or indirect 
participation in the management, control or capital of an enterprise covers only cases 
of interconnection, or exercise of influence, under company law. Whether there is a 
case of participation is decided by reference to (domestic) company law. Article 9 then 
decides on the form or extent of participation that is relevant.51 Dwarkasing referred to 
                                                          
47  OECD, op. cit., Commentary to Article 23 para 32.2 and 32.3. 
48  Ibid. Commentary to Article 9 Para 6. 
49  Dwarkasing, op. cit., at pg. 125, Vogel, op. cit., at pg. 526. 
50  Vogel, op. cit., at pg. 526; Dwarkasing, op. cit., at, at pg. 126. 
51  Vogel, op. cit., at pg. 523 and 525 
the OECD commentary to Article 9 where there was a bracket definition accompanying 
the term “associated enterprises”, he concluded that Article 9 only applies to the 
enterprises listed in the bracket definition of “associated enterprises”. This view is 
further supported by the findings and conclusions of the Carroll report. In the report, 
the reference to associated enterprises was made when the verification of business 
between the local subsidiary, parent company or other subsidiary companies of the 
parent was discussed. 52  
Article 9 uses the criteria of participation in the management, control or capital 
of an enterprise. The terms “participation”, “management” and “capital” are not defined 
in the OECD model. Only the term “control” is defined in the OECD glossary of tax 
terms. Control is defined as “the capacity of one person to ensure that another person 
acts in accordance with the first person’s wishes or the exercise of that capacity. The 
exercise of control by one person over another would enable individuals and 
corporations to avoid or reduce tax liability”. There is no guidance available in the 
commentary as to how these three criteria should be applied. 
Given the lack of guidance or definition on the criteria of participation in the 
management, control or capital of an enterprise, different authors have attempted to 
come up with their definition of these terms. We will first look at the meaning of the 
term “control”. Dwarkasing traces the chronological development of Article 9 to find 
out the original intent behind the Article. The original form of Article 9 in 1933 used the 
term “dominant participation in the management or capital of an enterprise”. This 
indicates that association between enterprises can only exist if the participation in 
capital or management can dominate or control the company i.e. not all types of 
participations is included. He thus argued that OECD did not consider participation in 
“control” to be a separate independent criterion. He cited Carroll who referred to the 
concept of interconnection envisaged under company law.53 The expression 
“dominant participation in management or capital” was replaced by the expression 
“participation in management, control or capital” by the Fiscal Committee of the OEEC. 
Based on various reports of the Fiscal Committee, Dwarkasing took the view that the 
Fiscal Committee used the word “control” as a generally accepted term. There was no 
intention to vary the scope covered under Article 9(1) with the revised wording. It was 
simply a redrafting i.e. the term “control” was used to replace the term “dominant”.54  
Moving further into the meaning of the terms “participation in management or 
capital”, from a company law perspective, Dwarkasing suggested that the terms 
“participation in capital” and “participation in management” referred to the controlling 
power that shareholders and management have over the enterprise respectively.55 
Putting all these concepts together, this would mean that for Article 9 to apply, we are 
literally looking at a situation where participants in capital and management are able 
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to influence the transfer prices of the enterprise. Vogel interprets the criteria in a similar 
manner. He held the view that the mere existence of interconnection or the exercise 
of influence under company law was not sufficient to trigger Article 9(1). Adjustments 
under Article 9(1) can only be made if the interconnection was the cause of special 
conditions being made or imposed beyond arm’s length. There are no maximum or 
minimum limits specified under the Article.56 
Dwarkasing also expressed the view that that the notion of “de facto control” 
used in IAS/FRS should not be confused with control originating from de facto 
situations, such as mere economic dominance. The concepts of control and 
association in financial accounting supports the view that control, for the application of 
ALP, does not cover mere economic dominance, outside relationships vested in 
company law.57  
Having discussed the “control” criterion, we move on to the “capital” criterion. 
Participation in capital can be considered by far to be the most common form of 
association.58 Vogel referred to the bracket definition of “associated enterprises” as 
found in the Commentary to the OECD MTC as the start point i.e.  “parent and 
subsidiary companies and companies under common control”. Dwarkasing expanded 
on Vogel’s view. He highlighted that the required relationship is based on shareholding 
i.e. participation by the parent in the capital of the subsidiary. Capital is raised in the 
form of equity or financing through borrowings.59 Company law covers shareholders’ 
relationships and the relationships between management, shareholder and the 
company. It deals with the capital stock of the company and the relationship between 
the investor and the managers.60  As mentioned above, Article 9 does not provide a 
maximum or minimum limitation with regards to direct or indirect participation in the 
capital of an enterprise. What matters is the extent of control/influence that a 
shareholder has over an enterprise of another contracting state as a result of such 
participation. Specifically in the context of Article 9, the crux of the issue is whether 
this shareholder is able to control the transfer prices between the two enterprises. 
Control can be defined as the power to direct the strategic financial or operating 
activities of an entity, and thus the right to exercise whatever discretion in strategic 
decision-making.61 
 Finally, we move on to the criterion of “management”. Dwarkasing referred to 
the commentary to Article 4 found in the 1927 report of the second Committee of 
Technical Experts.62 In the commentary, he noted that the term “management and 
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control” was used together when references were made to the real centre of control in 
the determination of residence. Based on his observation, he expressed the view that 
there was a special meaning and purpose behind this combination of “management 
and control” i.e. to prevent evasion and tax avoidance. Article 5 of the 1927 Draft 
Convention, the predecessor of today’s Article 9, which dealt with the taxation of 
permanent establishments used similar phrasing. He drew similar inferences that the 
intent of the use of these words was to also prevent evasion and tax avoidance in the 
Article. The term “participation in the management or capital of an enterprise” found 
its way into Article 5 of the draft Convention of the 1933 Report, the predecessor of 
Article 9. These terms have remained in Article 9 since then.  
From the authors’ perspective, the chronological development of Article 9 is 
critical to understanding the intended scope of the Article. The bracket definition in the 
commentary to Article 9 is in line with the development of Article 9. The authors are of 
the view that Article 9 was intended to apply to parent and subsidiaries, and companies 
under common control i.e. companies in the same group that belonged to the same 
ultimate parent. As mentioned above, it was clear that the original intention was to 
ensure the proper allocation of profits between enterprises that had common 
ownership of stock or capital. This observation is supplemented further by the fact that 
this issue was originally addressed in the same manner as PEs and its head office, 
which could be seen as the closest analogy.  
The authors would argue that all three elements of participation in capital, 
management and control have to be present for two enterprises to be considered as 
associated for the purpose of Article 9. The authors agree that the interconnectedness 
that we are looking for in Article 9 may be found in company law which governs the 
relationship between the companies. However, mere interconnectedness is 
insufficient for the application of the Article. It has to be demonstrated that such 
interconnectedness leads to an ability to influence the transfer pricing between 
enterprises before this Article can be applied. Mere passive shareholding, even a 
majority shareholding, would be insufficient if there is no ability to influence the 
operations of the company strategically. There has to be management that results in 
control. The application of Article 9 requires a qualitative assessment that these 
conditions are met.  
The authors note that many countries do apply quantitative criteria for e.g. 
specific percentages in their domestic legislation to define associated enterprises.63 It 
could be argued that the qualitative assessment that is required under Article 9 is 
replaced if countries were to apply only their quantitative approach when applying 
Article 9. Where both the qualitative and quantitative approaches yield the same 
outcome, Article 9 can be triggered to remove any economic double taxation that 
results. Where there is a disparity, Article 9 cannot be used. If we were to go by our 
view that there is an autonomous interpretation to the term associated enterprises, 
                                                          
63  Dwarkasing op. cit, at pg. 153. 
countries should perhaps not apply their domestic thresholds to determine which 
enterprises should fall under Article 9. As aptly pointed out by Dwarkasing, if a blunt 
shareholding percentage is used, it may not always be the case that a shareholder 
with that level of holding would always be in control of the enterprise.64 Article 9 may 
be end up being wrongly applied.  
When the concept of associated enterprises was first derived and first defined, 
the OECD or its predecessors worked on the basis that there was a general level 
understanding of the terms “control”, “under common control”, “associated 
enterprises”. Thus there was no need to define these terms specifically.65  Given the 
passage of time and the evolution of business models, looking at the way different 
indicia that has been used by jurisdictions in domestic law to define related parties or 
associated enterprises e.g. common management etc. (please refer to section 4.3 
below), the authors would like to suggest that there might be a possibility that the 
general understanding of the terms “control”, “under common control” may have 
changed. For example, many jurisdictions have used the criterion of common directors 
on the boards of two different enterprises to define association. In the present day, 
putting aside the need to ensure that the director exercised his fiduciary duties towards 
both enterprises, it might potentially be true that such a relationship would enable the 
director to literally influence the transfer prices between these two enterprises. This is 
especially so in this day of increasing mobility of individuals and with the advent of 
technology that greatly facilitates real time communication across borders. These two 
enterprises could fall under the scope of Article 9. Hence, there may be room to read 
the scope of Article 9 to encompass companies that share common directors on their 
respective boards. Based on the authors’ assessment, the wording of the Article 9 
would be broad enough to accommodate such an interpretation. 
  
To achieve maximum effectiveness for Article 9, the authors share 
Dwarkasing’s views that the OECD could provide more clarity on the definition of 
associated enterprises, the concept of “associated enterprises” should not be broadly 
interpreted and the “element of control” is not an independent criterion.66 More clarity 
on the definition would help two contracting States apply the Article better and help to 
eliminate economic double taxation. Having a tighter definition would be akin to finding 
the lowest common denominator that makes the article acceptable to most 
jurisdictions thus improving its effectiveness. Lastly, the “control” criterion is the key to 
the objective of the Article. The ability of one enterprise to “control” the other enterprise 
is necessary before the Article should be applied.   
 
The next section of this paper looks at the definition of “associated enterprises” 
and “related parties” that are used domestically by different enterprises. 
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 4.3. Domestic tax law definitions of associated enterprises 
To understand how jurisdictions define the associated enterprises that fall 
within the scope of their transfer pricing regimes, a representative selection of 
jurisdictions were reviewed. The jurisdictions surveyed include those of developed and 
developing countries, as well as different regions globally, namely the Americas (the 
United States, Canada), Europe (the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Ireland), the Asia Pacific (Japan, Korea, India, 
China, Australia, New Zealand) and the smaller subset within the Asia Pacific of 
Southeast Asian jurisdictions (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore). A 
key challenge faced by jurisdictions in defining the associated enterprises that fall 
within their transfer pricing regimes is where to place this definition within a whole 
spectrum of possibilities, particularly in view of the interconnectivity of businesses and 
global supply chains. On one end of the spectrum, jurisdictions could adopt a more 
formalistic approach using quantitative thresholds (e.g. extent of participation in 
capital). On the other end of the spectrum, jurisdictions may instead adopt a more 
qualitative approach (e.g. based on substance). 
 
However, while the OECD MTC adopts the notion of ‘associated enterprises’ in 
Article 9, many of the jurisdictions surveyed do not necessarily use the same term or 
notion in their transfer pricing regimes. Jurisdictions that adopt the term ‘associated 
enterprises’ in their transfer pricing legislation generally have domestic definitions of 
the term that may contain similar wordings as the OECD MTC or its commentary, but 
often these domestic definitions extend beyond the definition provided by the OECD. 
For example, in the case of India,  
“…associated enterprise”, in relation to another enterprise, means an 
enterprise— 
(a) which participates, directly or indirectly, or through one or more 
intermediaries, in the management or control or capital of the other enterprise; 
or 
(b) in respect of which one or more persons who participate, directly or 
indirectly, or through one or more intermediaries, in its management or control 
or capital, are the same persons who participate, directly or indirectly, or 
through one or more intermediaries, in the management or control or capital of 
the other enterprise.”67  
This definition of associated enterprises is reminiscent of that found in Article 9 of the 
OECD MTC. However, India’s Income Tax Act then elaborates upon its definition of 
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associated enterprises by specifying thirteen circumstances whereby associated 
enterprises would be established.68 For instance, one scenario involves an enterprise 
holding, directly or indirectly, shares carrying not less than twenty-six per cent of the 
voting power in the other enterprise at any time in the previous year, while another 
scenario describes an enterprise guaranteeing not less than ten per cent of the total 
borrowings of the other enterprise at any time in the previous year. A summary of the 
thirteen circumstances contained in the definition is at Appendix 1. Such elaborations 
on the term ‘associated enterprise’ clearly extends beyond the interpretation provided 
for in the OECD MTC and its commentary.  
Most of the jurisdictions surveyed refer to ‘related parties’ or ‘related persons’ 
in their domestic transfer pricing regimes instead of the term ‘associated enterprises’. 
The authors are of the view that a possible explanation points towards how domestic 
legislation had evolved with the use of ‘related parties’ or ‘related persons’ in other 
parts of the domestic tax law, and thus a natural extension of the use of the term was 
adopted for transfer pricing purposes. On the other hand, the term ‘associated 
enterprises’, as detailed above, developed relatively independently in the context of 
the OECD MTC and its associated texts. We discuss later at section 5 an analysis with 
regard to Singapore’s case. 
A brief summary of the definition of related parties / related persons / associated 
enterprises (referred to simply as related parties henceforth in this Section) for the 
surveyed jurisdictions may be found in Appendix 1. We discuss our key observations 
in the remaining paragraphs of this section. 
Firstly, we observe that most jurisdictions make reference to the concept of 
‘control’ in determining if two parties are related for the purpose of transfer pricing. 
However, the concept of ‘control’ is defined to varying extents by each jurisdiction. 
There are generally two models adopted by jurisdictions in defining control. One model 
is through consideration of either (i) the holding of shares above a certain threshold, 
or (ii) control in substance (i.e. as a qualitative assessment or via specifically identified 
scenarios). Control is therefore established where either (i) or (ii) takes place. The 
second model does not prescribe the holding of shares above a threshold percentage 
to define control, but instead focuses on merely determining if there is control in 
substance (i.e. (ii) in the preceding sentence). 
Where jurisdictions consider control to be present if there are shareholding 
relationships, the legislative scope generally covers shares held directly or indirectly 
of one party by the other party or vice versa, or where there is a third party that holds 
directly or indirectly shares of the two parties concerned. This is not unlike the 
description of the participation in capital between associated enterprises envisioned 
under Article 9 of the OECD MTC. In terms of the shareholding percentage thresholds 
adopted by these jurisdictions, they typically cluster around two points: twenty-five or 
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twenty-six per cent (e.g. China, Germany, India, Indonesia) and fifty or fifty-one per 
cent (e.g. Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea).  Where control is determined via a 
shareholding threshold, this is a fairly blunt test. Take for example, for an enterprise in 
China, where one shareholder holds only fifteen per cent of another enterprise, but 
this shareholder holds the single largest share due to diversified holdings of the 
remaining shares, this shareholder would have sufficient voting power to control the 
other enterprise but not be caught under the associated enterprise definition in 
China.69   
How control is to be determined in substance presents an even broader range 
of definitions amongst the jurisdictions surveyed. Most jurisdictions use one or a 
combination of the following concepts: 
a) Participation in the management, control or capital of the other party, using 
the same or similar wording as that found in Article 9 sub-paragraphs 1a) 
or 1b)of the OECD MTC; 
b) Dependence through financial relationships where there is an extension of 
loans or guarantees to the other party; 
c) Dependence through business relationships e.g. measured by the 
purchases and/or turnover of the business;  
d) Common member or members of the Board of Directors of the other party; 
e) Dependence on the personnel of the other party; 
f) Dependence on the intangibles or technologies supplied or held by the 
other party; or 
g) Other specific definitions provided for by some jurisdictions regarding what 
constitutes control, that are usually conceptual in nature. For example, 
Germany describes a situation where there is a direct or collateral 
possibility to exert a dominating influence to the related party, while 
Belgium states specifically that its transfer pricing legislation may apply to 
third parties.  
While every jurisdiction surveyed has its own provisions defining the scope of 
related parties falling under its transfer pricing regime, a unique treatment exists for 
the case of Switzerland. For Switzerland, there are no specific definitions of related 
parties and instead direct reference is made towards the application of the OECD 
TPG, including the definition contained within with regard to associated enterprises.70 
It is noteworthy to mention that Switzerland’s adherence to the OECD TPG applies to 
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all subsequent updates to the Guidelines, e.g. changes to the Guidelines resulting 
from the BEPS Action Plan.  
Australia is another jurisdiction that makes reference to the definition of 
associated enterprises contained in the OECD TPG, but by way of referring to the 
definitions of associated enterprises adopted in the relevant tax treaties, where 
applicable. Unlike many other jurisdictions, Australia does not in the first instance 
determine the related parties that fall within the scope of its transfer pricing legislation 
but instead determines that its transfer pricing regime applies if there is a ‘transfer 
pricing benefit’.71 This benefit is then defined in the context of the Associated 
Enterprises Article in its tax treaties where relevant, or a similar concept in cases 
where no tax treaties apply. In other words, while Australia has its own comprehensive 
set of domestic transfer pricing legislation, for the purpose of defining the entities and 
consequently transactions that fall within its regime, there is a degree of alignment 
with the definitions of associated enterprises adopted in its tax treaties. 
None of the surveyed jurisdictions impose their transfer pricing regimes on 
unrelated party transactions, but we note that a few jurisdictions, such as Brazil and 
Argentina, may in fact do so. Brazil, for instance, applies its transfer pricing rules on 
transactions that its taxpayers enter into with entities located in low tax jurisdictions, 
regardless of whether the parties transacting are considered related or not. The low 
tax jurisdictions are blacklisted in a Normative Instruction RFB No. 1,037/2010, 
amended in 2016 by a Normative Instruction RFB No. 1,658, released by Brazil’s 
Federal Revenue (RFB). The authors are of the view that such a policy reflects a 
transfer pricing regime directed towards counteracting tax avoidance, rather than one 
that seeks to ascertain a fair allocation of profits to be taxed amongst jurisdictions. 
 
4.4. Definitions of associated enterprises for customs purposes 
In addition to Article 9 of the OECD MTC and domestic legislation dealing 
directly with transfer pricing, there are other aspects of international and / or domestic 
laws that could either rely on or impact the concept of associated enterprises for tax 
purposes. One such area pertains to customs duty, which is imposed primarily on the 
customs value of imported goods.72 The WTO Valuation Agreement sets out the 
customs valuation methodology that WTO Member countries are obligated to adopt 
and the ‘transaction value’ is mainly used to determine the customs value.73 There are 
generally two components to the transaction value: the price actually paid or payable 
for the imported goods and a series of cost elements not included in the invoice price 
(adjustments). This second component could include, for example, royalties or license 
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fees related to the goods that the buyer must pay as a condition of sale of the goods, 
to the extent that the royalties or license fees are not included in the price actually paid 
or payable on the goods. 
Based on Article 1 of the WTO Valuation Agreement, the acceptability of the 
price actually paid or payable is affected by a number of conditions, one of which is 
where the buyer and seller of the goods are related. For this purpose, the Agreement 
defines related parties as follows: 
“…(a) they are officers or directors of one another’s businesses; 
(b) they are legally recognized partners in business; 
(c) they are employer and employee; 
(d) any person directly or indirectly owns, controls or holds 5 per cent or more of the 
outstanding voting stocks or shares of both of them; 
(e) one of them directly or indirectly controls the other; 
(f) both of them are directly or indirectly controlled by a third person; 
(g) together they directly or indirectly control a third person; or 
(h) they are members of the same family.”74        
 Besides the WTO Valuation Agreement, some jurisdictions have their own 
definitions of related persons for customs valuation purposes in their domestic laws. 
For example, the United States defines related persons for such purposes as 
members of the same family, shared officers or directors, partners, employers and 
employees or a party with at least five per cent controlling interest in the other.75 
 The mere existence of related buyers and sellers is insufficient grounds to 
disregard the transaction value. There must be evidence that the relationship had 
influenced the price.76 The WCO Guide to Customs Valuation and Transfer Pricing 
acknowledges that since the aim of the determination of prices for customs as well as 
transfer pricing purposes is the same, i.e. to seek an arm’s length price, transfer pricing 
documentation may provide useful information for customs purposes authorities on a 
case by case basis. Indeed, this was previously confirmed through the adoption by the 
WCO of Commentary 23.1, developed by the WCO’s Technical Committee on 
Customs Valuation in response to proposals by a WCO focus group consisting of 
customs officials, tax officials and business representatives. This consistent 
recommendation arises despite the acknowledgement that there could nonetheless 
be differences in the approaches for customs compared to income tax.  
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 This paper does not set out to discuss the issues arising from the reliance for 
customs purposes on transfer pricing documentation. The recommendation to obtain 
useful information from transfer pricing documentation where relevant presents an 
avenue for taxpayers to leverage on resources and demonstrate consistency in the 
application of the arm’s length principle. However, the authors are of the view that if 
one were to approach the recommendation from the consideration of what is defined 
as related persons, it is clear that the scope of related persons for customs purposes 
is different from the scope of related persons for transfer pricing purposes. For 
instance, a mere 5% shareholding by a third party of both the seller and buyer would 
deem the buyer and seller to be related parties for customs purposes. However, this 
single fact does not signal the existence of associated enterprises under Article 9 of 
the OECD MTC or related parties in the domestic transfer pricing jurisdictions 
surveyed. In such an instance, there would be no meaningful leverage on transfer 
pricing analysis since there is likely to be no transfer pricing documentation prepared 
in the first place.  
 
4.5. Definitions of associated enterprises for accounting purposes 
From an accounting perspective, International Accounting Standard (IAS) 24 - 
Related Party Disclosures requires disclosures about transactions and outstanding 
balances with an entity's related parties. In the context of a company, the categories 
of entities and people defined as related parties are where:  
i) The entity and the reporting entity are members of the same group (which 
means that each parent, subsidiary and fellow subsidiary is related to the others); 
ii) One entity is an associate or joint venture of the other entity (or an associate or 
joint venture of a member of a group of which the other entity is a member); 
iii) Both entities are joint ventures of the same third party; 
iv) One entity is a joint venture of a third entity and the other entity is an associate 
of the third entity; 
v) The entity is a post-employment defined benefit plan for the benefit of 
employees of either the reporting entity or an entity related to the reporting entity. If 
the reporting entity is itself such a plan, the sponsoring employers are also related to 
the reporting entity; 
vi) The entity is controlled or jointly controlled by a person who is identified as a 
person / close member of that person's family that is related to a reporting entity; 
vii) A person, who is a person or a close member of that person's family that is 
related to a reporting entity and has control or joint control over the reporting entity, 
has significant influence over the entity or is a member of the key management 
personnel of the entity (or of a parent of the entity); or 
viii) The entity, or any member of a group of which it is a part, provides key 
management personnel services to the reporting entity or to the parent of the reporting 
entity. 
In addition to stating what are the related parties to be disclosed in the financial 
statements, IAS 24 also states what instances are deemed not to be related, namely: 
i) Two entities simply because they have a director or key manager in common; 
ii) Two venturers who share joint control over a joint venture; 
iii) Providers of finance, trade unions, public utilities, and departments and 
agencies of a government that does not control, jointly control or significantly influence 
the reporting entity, simply by virtue of their normal dealings with an entity (even 
though they may affect the freedom of action of an entity or participate in its decision-
making process); or 
iv) A single customer, supplier, franchiser, distributor, or general agent with whom 
an entity transacts a significant volume of business merely by virtue of the resulting 
economic dependence. 
IAS 24 ensures that the necessary disclosures are disclosed in a reporting 
entity’s financial statements, to make known the possibility that the entity's financial 
position may have been affected by what are considered under the standard to be 
related parties, and by transactions and outstanding balances with such parties. Thus, 
it is not surprising that the definition of related parties provided for under IAS 24 (and 
other accounting standards concerning related parties) is extensive and covers more 
entities and situations compared to those found under Article 9 of the OECD MTC or 
individual jurisdictions’ domestic transfer pricing regimes.  
On the other hand, IAS 24 makes it clear that two entities with joint control in a 
joint venture do not constitute related parties. The concept of economic dependence 
through a major supplier or customer is also not present under IAS 24. It would appear 
that generally there is seemingly less reliance under IAS 24 on the determination of 
control from a substance perspective. Thus while the definition of related parties under 
IAS 24 is generally broader than that for transfer pricing purposes, there could be 
specific instances, particularly where the domestic transfer pricing regime applies a 
prescriptive definition for related parties, parties considered related for transfer pricing 
purposes may not be disclosed in the financial accounts. 
The problem arises when the definition of related parties used for accounting 
disclosure purposes is used for tax reporting or even audit purposes. Ideally, tax 
authorities should recognize that the related parties disclosed in financial statements 
hold limited meaning from a tax perspective. To determine the level and nature of 
related party transactions for an entity for transfer pricing purposes, it is still preferred 
that a definition of related parties as close to, if not the same as, the definition for 
transfer pricing purposes is used. The authors are of the view that the definition of 
related parties for transfer pricing purposes could already be vastly different upon 
analysis of Article 9 of the OECD MTC compared to domestic transfer pricing regimes, 
so the use of accounting definitions for tax purposes adds an unnecessary layer of 
complexity to the issue (see section 6.4). 
4.6. Interaction between domestic tax law and international tax law 
Tax treaties are meant to restrict the application of domestic tax rules.77 Where 
a jurisdiction’s domestic legislation imposes profit adjustments on enterprises which 
are associated by definition but where there is no control, it is arguable that the 
jurisdiction is not acting in accordance with Article 9(1) of the treaty and the other 
contracting state is not obliged to provide double taxation relief under Article 9(2). It 
would also be arguable that given Article 9(1) is only applicable in the transactions 
between associated enterprises, if a jurisdiction makes adjustments on the 
transactions between two enterprises which are not associated under the treaty, but 
associated under domestic law, the Article would not be applicable. 
 
That said, in an ideal world where all enterprises transact on similar terms and 
conditions regardless of association by control or definition and all jurisdictions have 
the same view on what is ALP, there would not be a need for transfer pricing 
adjustments to be made. The disparity between the definitions of associated 
enterprises in domestic law and treaty law would not matter. However, in our imperfect 
world, some enterprises do not transact on an arms’ length basis. Different 
jurisdictions have a different view on what is considered arms’ length under the same 
fact pattern. Hence, instances of unrelieved economic double taxation would occur 
where the jurisdiction make transfer pricing adjustments in respect of enterprises that 
are not covered under the scope of Article 9. A possible solution would be for both 
contracting states to find a solution via Art 25(3) to remove the economic double 
taxation.78  
 
5. Singapore’s context 
5.1 Definition of related party in Singapore’s tax treaties 
Singapore’s treaties have consistently followed OECD’s Article 9(1) in almost 
its entirety. While there are some slight deviations in terms of the drafting for Article 
9(1) for some of the older treaties, these are mainly editorial and do not change the 
meaning of Article 9(1).  Singapore has not made any reservations on Article 9 in the 
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Singapore has a dualistic system. Parliamentary consent is not necessary for 
the conclusion of tax treaties. Bilateral treaties that are signed with Singapore require 
enabling legislation before they are given legal effect.79 Treaties restrict the application 
of domestic law in Singapore. 
 
5.2 Definition of related party under Singapore domestic tax law 
 
Singapore’s domestic law for making transfer pricing adjustments comes from 
Section 34D of the Singapore Income Tax Act (SITA). Section 34D gives the 
comptroller the authority to make transfer pricing adjustments to bring the results back 
to arm’s length between related parties. While the wording of Section 34D is very close 
to that of Article 9(1) of the OECD MTC, Section 34D does not use the term 
“associated enterprises”. On the contrary, Section 34D only uses the term “related 
parties”. The definition of “related party” is defined in Section 13(16) of the SITA as 
follows: 
 
“related party” in relation to a person, means any other person who, directly or 
indirectly, controls that person, or is controlled, directly or indirectly, by that 
person, or where he and that other person, directly or indirectly, are under the 
control of a common person. 
 
 Based on Section 13(16) above, two persons are related to each other if one 
person controls the other either directly or indirectly. Two persons can also be related 
to each other if they both come under the direct or indirect control of the same person. 
There is no specific definition of ‘control’ under the SITA. 
 
In fact, this definition of related parties under Section 13(16) is not used 
exclusively for transfer pricing purposes. Section 34D was legislated in 2009 but the 
definition of related parties under Section 13(16) was already in existence before that 
and used by other sections of the SITA. The other sections of the SITA that rely on 
the same definition are: 
 
(i) Limitations on the deduction for expenditure on licensing intellectual property 
rights and the writing down allowances for intellectual property rights acquired under 
Sections 14W and 19B respectively; 
 
(ii) Restriction on the exemption of certain sources of income under Section 13; 
and 
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(iii) Restriction on the concessionary rate of tax for income derived from debt 
securities under Section 43N. 
 
 However, the concept of ‘control’ between two persons in the SITA is not 
confined only to Section 13(16). Section 24, for example, deals with the capital 
allowances consequences in a situation where there is a sale of property and the buyer 
is a person over whom the seller has control, or the seller is a person over whom the 
buyer has control, or both the seller and buyer are persons and some other person 
has control over both of them. Such a description is similar to the definition contained 
within Section 13(16), yet a separate definition was used without the need to refer to 
Section 13(16).  
 
In general, Section 13(16) can be said to be broader in scope than Article 9(1). 
It is possible that transfer pricing adjustments might be carried out in Singapore under 
Section 34D which would not be covered under Article 9 of Singapore’s treaties. There 
are some similarities between Section 13(16) and Article 9(1) of the OECD MTC. Both 
rely on the notion of having control. At a general level, association is created where 
one person is a shareholder of the other person; or if both persons have common 
shareholders. On the other hand, Section 13(16) applies to both enterprises and non-
enterprises. Section 13(16) also did not limit the type of situation under which control 
may be exercised i.e. it seems as long as control can be established between two 
parties, they are considered related. This is different from Article 9(1) which requires 
participation in management, capital or control.  
 
In a treaty context, given that Singapore did not express any reservations on 
Article 9 of the OECD MTC, Singapore would likely take the position that there is an 
autonomous interpretation of Article 9(1). At present, this is an untested area in terms 
of the application of Singapore’s treaties. Hence, it is unclear exactly how Singapore 
would interpret the scope of Article 9(1). As there is not much guidance in the 
commentary to the OECD MTC on the interpretation of Article 9(1), it is possible that 
Singapore would rely on the bracket definition of associated enterprises. This position 
would be aligned to what is done in practice. The most common situation encountered 
under Article 9 would be in respect of transactions between parent and subsidiaries or 
subsidiaries belonging to the same group. 
 
In view of the above, it would be useful if there could be further guidance given 
by Singapore in respect of Section 34D. Singapore could share on the objectives of 
Section 34D and its scope of application. A more specific definition and scope of 
related parties for the purpose of transfer pricing and the application of Section 34D 
could be legislated instead of placing reliance on the definition contained in Section 
13(16), which currently serves multiple purposes.  
 
Given the lack of guidance from the OECD on the exact definition of Article 9(1), 
it would be difficult for Singapore to express a position on how it would read Article 
9(1). As pointed out in earlier paragraphs, most instances of transfer pricing 
adjustments encountered i.e. in respect of parent and subsidiaries or subsidiaries 
belonging to the same group have already been addressed. There should be limited 
practical impact arising from the dichotomy between related parties and associated 
enterprises in a Singapore context. 
 
6. Practical implications 
Based on our analysis above, the authors would like to point out certain 
practical implications that were not considered in both Article 9(1) of the OECD MTC 
or domestic transfer pricing legislation. 
6.1. Joint Ventures 
A joint venture (JV) is a business entity created by two or more parties, 
generally characterized by shared ownership, shared returns and risks and shared 
governance. Most JVs are incorporated, although in certain industries such as in oil 
and gas, JVs may be unincorporated but mimic a corporate entity. For the purpose of 
this paper, the authors would like to distinguish a JV from an entity within the MNE 
group that is not wholly owned. Group entities may not be wholly owned for a variety 
of reasons for e.g. legacy reasons or for regulatory reasons where foreign ownership 
of local entities is not allowed etc. 
Assume the case of a JV in State A, that is made up of two enterprises in 
States B and C, both having equal ownership. As a result, both parties would have 
equal returns and risks and governance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
In the interest of the States A, B and C, the profits arising from transactions 
between Enterprises A and B and Enterprises A and C should be properly allocated. 
Enterprises B and C are unrelated parties.  
Given that both enterprises have the same level of control over Enterprise A, 
Enterprises B and C would ensure that transactions are carried out at arm’s length. 
Although there does not seem to be much concerns in this instance, for the purpose 
Enterprise A 
JV 
Enterprise B 
Enterprise C 
State B 
State C 
State A 
of this paper, the crux of the issue would be whether Enterprise A can be considered 
to be an associated enterprise of Enterprises B or C under Article 9(1) of the OECD 
MTC. The question is whether joint control is envisaged in the context of Article 9(1). 
If we take into consideration the notion of dominant control as described earlier in this 
paper, given that neither Enterprise B nor C has dominant control over Enterprise A 
(there is equal control), the authors would argue that Enterprises B and C are not 
associated enterprises of Enterprise A. This view is also supported by Dwarkasing.80  
If the facts of the case were to be tweaked such that Enterprise B now has a 
greater share of ownership of Enterprise A than Enterprise C, based on a literal 
reading of Article 9(1), the authors would now argue that Enterprise B would have 
dominant control over Enterprise A by virtue of its majority participation in the capital 
of Enterprise A. Enterprises A and B are associated enterprises. However, if we were 
to look deeper into this, we could argue that Enterprise C, being unrelated to Enterprise 
B, would seek to ensure that transactions between Enterprise A and B would be 
conducted at arm’s length. The nature of these transactions would not fall under the 
original intent of Article 9(1). 
Practically, this presents the question of whether transfer pricing analysis and 
documentation would be required for JVs or for certain JVs depending on their 
structures. For countries that adopt the concept of control in substance in their 
domestic transfer pricing regimes, an enterprise transacting with its JV could arguably 
fall outside of the regime if there is a case to state that there is no control of the JV. 
For example, if there are two unrelated investors to the JV having equal decision 
making or voting rights, each investor cannot be said to be in control of the JV. 
However, some jurisdictions may hold the view that joint control reflects control in 
substance, even if the investors to the JV are unrelated and could even be industry 
competitors, as the JV reflects a common interest for its investors and transfer pricing 
therefore applies to the transactions between its investors and the JV.  
Some jurisdictions that prescribe a threshold for shareholding to determine 
control do so by reference to the enterprise’s share of voting rights or income 
distribution. If so, it is also likely that the enterprise would be considered a related party 
of its JV if its share of voting rights of or income distribution from the JV exceeds the 
prescribed shareholding threshold. Another approach is to prescribe a specific 
shareholding threshold to apply to JVs. For example, in the United Kingdom, the 
shareholding threshold applied for JVs is 40%.81 
The disparity of the treatment of JVs by jurisdictions in determining if and which 
transactions with an enterprise’s JVs fall under their respective transfer pricing 
regimes results in some degree of asymmetry in the need for transfer pricing analysis 
and documentation for such transactions. Furthermore, the interaction of the 
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jurisdictions’ domestic transfer pricing regimes with the respective jurisdictions’ 
interpretations of Article 9 of their tax treaties presents yet another layer of 
complication with regard to transfer pricing risk management and protection from 
double taxation.82 
Based on the above, it is worth having further thoughts on the topic of JVs. The 
concept of JVs is not quite the same as the concept of group entities. Group entities 
are generally related based on common control throughout the group. On the other 
hand, JVs and the parties constituting the JVs are unrelated to begin with. Based on 
the original intention and scope of Article 9(1), the authors are of the view that JVs 
should not be caught within the scope of associated enterprises. In this respect, more 
guidance and clarification from the OECD on this point would be helpful. That said, if 
there are concerns of JV parties colluding and transactions between JVs and the JV 
parties are not at ALP, this problem should be addressed from an anti-avoidance 
perspective and not through Article 9. 
6.2. Family owned companies/businesses 
Article 9 works on the premise of determining participation under company law.  
It is based on the traditional model of company ownership with a parent at the top of 
the hierarchy. Management of the group of companies is generally centralized.  
However, not all companies are owned or managed in this manner. 
Family owned companies/businesses may differ in terms of holding structure 
from the traditional model that has been discussed throughout the paper. For the 
purpose of this paper, “family business” is defined as a business where: 
a) The majority of votes are held by the person who established or acquired 
the firm (or their spouses, parents, child, or child’s direct heirs); 
b) At least one representative of the family is involved in the management or 
administration of the firm; 
c) In the case of a listed company, the person who established or acquired 
the firm (or their families) possess 25% of the right to vote through their 
share capital and there is at least one family member on the board of the 
company.83 
  These companies/business can range from small and midsized companies to 
big companies such as BMW, Samsung and Wal-Mart stores. Many of these family 
businesses are privately held holding companies with reasonably independent 
subsidiaries that might be publicly owned. 84  In some instances, the family may hold 
the business through private trusts. In general, the family holding company might fully 
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84  Casper C. et al, ‘The five attributes of enduring family business’, Mckinsey & Company, 
January 2010. 
control the more important subsidiaries. By keeping the holding private, the family 
avoids conflicts of interest with more diversified institutional investors looking for higher 
short-term returns. Financial policies often aim to keep the family in control.85 
Traditionally, most family business looked at passing on ownership and management 
to their next generation. However, this trend is now evolving. Many family businesses 
are looking at passing on only ownership, but not management to the next generation. 
With the above in mind, the authors are of the view that there are ambiguities 
when it comes to the application of Article 9 of the OECD MTC and domestic transfer 
pricing regimes to family owned companies/businesses. 
From an Article 9 perspective, its impact on family businesses can be looked at 
from different perspectives; namely family business owned via private holding 
company(ies) and family owned business owned via private trusts. 
For family businesses owned via private holding companies, the authors are of 
the view that there could be two possible outcomes which is dependent on the 
ownership and management model of the holding companies. If the owners of the 
private holding company are also undertaking the management of the enterprises that 
it owns, the authors hold the view that Article 9 of the OECD MTC will apply. The 
private holding company can be said to participate in the capital, management and 
control of the other enterprises. In some instances, the owners of the private holding 
company do not undertake the management of the enterprises that it owns. It might 
have another enterprise below it in the structure where it employs professional 
management, which helps to manage and control the other enterprises further down 
or horizontally in the ownership chain. It could also have enterprises which are 
independently managed.  
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For such situations, the authors are of the view that the applicability of Article 9 
becomes murky for the private holding company. While it is possible that the private 
holding company may still hold the majority shareholding in the other enterprises and 
be considered to participate directly or indirectly in the share capital of the enterprises, 
it is arguable if it can be considered to have control of the enterprise or participation in 
management of the enterprise i.e. it is not as clear if the other enterprises can be 
considered to be associated enterprises of the private holding company.86 For the 
other enterprises, Enterprises A and B are likely to be associated enterprises by virtue 
of Article 9(1)(a). This is one of the most common scenarios. The situation is a little 
unclear as to whether Enterprises A and C are likely to be associated enterprises by 
virtue of Article 9(1)(b). The private holding company can be said to participate directly 
in the share capital of both Enterprises A and C. Given that we are not clear if 
Enterprise A and private holding company has an association, to the authors, it is not 
clear if the private holding company can be said to be participating in both the 
management, control or capital of Enterprises A and C to create such association. For 
Enterprises B and C, the analysis would be the same as that of Enterprises A and C. 
From a practical perspective, this would mean that Enterprises A and B would 
potentially have no protection under Articles 9 and 25 for its transactions with 
Enterprise C, although Enterprise A would have some control over these transactions 
in effect. It is unlikely that there would be many transactions between the private 
holding company and the enterprises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the scenario above, if the private holding company holds enterprises that are 
independently run, the authors hold the view that the enterprises should not be 
considered as associated enterprises of the private holding company. The enterprises 
should also not be considered as associated enterprises with respect to one another. 
Between the private holding company and the enterprise, while the private holding 
company participates in the capital of the enterprise, given that the enterprise are 
independently managed, it might be difficult to argue that the private holding company 
participate in the management of these enterprises or have control of these 
enterprises. In terms of the relationship between the enterprises, given that the 
enterprises cannot be said to be associated enterprises of the private holding, by 
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extension, Article 9(1)(b) cannot apply. Similarly, if each of the independently run 
enterprises have a group of enterprises under it, the authors would hold the view that 
the groups are not associated with each other. Only enterprises within the same group 
can be said to be associated enterprises of each other, subject to their holding 
structure.  
In view of the above, it can be seen that Article 9 was not envisaged to be 
applied to family owned companies. Should the OECD consider clarifying the definition 
of “associated enterprises”, this would be another area for the OECD to address. The 
authors hold the view that the definition of associated enterprises should not be overly 
broad. It should encapsulate the notion of common control throughout the chain of 
enterprises i.e. only groups of enterprises which are centrally controlled should be 
captured under the definition. 
6.3. Comparability 
Article 9 calls for associated enterprises to transact on the same terms and 
conditions as unrelated enterprises. In practice, the terms and conditions under which 
unrelated enterprises transact are found and applied to transactions carried out 
between associated enterprises. Some authors have criticized that it is a fallacy to be 
able to find transactions among unrelated parties which could be used as meaningful 
benchmarks.87 This is evidenced by the increasing use of profit split methods by tax 
authorities in the absence of market comparables.88 Based on the theory of the firm89, 
internalization allows integrated enterprises to carry out transactions more efficiently 
than independent enterprises which must follow market prices. MNEs are created 
because they generate returns internally above what can be obtained in market 
transactions.90 In view of these, it did not seem logical to find comparable transactions 
between unrelated parties and to use this result in transactions between associated 
enterprises.  
From a domestic law perspective, many jurisdictions impose threshold 
requirements in their respective legislations to deem association for the purpose of 
transfer pricing. From a comparability analysis perspective, this has practical 
implications in the search for comparables to benchmark an arm’s length outcome. 
Basically, this means that the comparables selected when benchmarking a particular 
transaction for an enterprise of a jurisdiction must have an independence criterion that 
is lower than the shareholding threshold applied in that jurisdiction to deem association 
                                                          
87  Avi-Yonah & I. Benshalom, ‘Formulary apportionment – Myths and Prospects: promoting Better 
International Tax Policies by Utilizing the Misunderstood and Under-Theorized Formulary 
Alternative’, 3  World Tax J. 3(2022), Journals IBFD at sec 2.2. 
88  E. Baistrocchi, The Transfer Pricing Problem: A Global Proposal for Simplification, 59 The Tax 
Law. 4, pg. 949 (2006). 
89  R. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economics 16 (1937) and O.E. Williamson, Markets and 
Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (Free Press 1975). 
90  R. Vann, Reflections on Business Profits and the Arm’s-Length Principle, in The Taxation of 
Business Profits Under Tax Treaties (B.J. Arnold, J. Sasseville & E.M. Zolt eds., Can. Tax Fund 
2003), at pg. 140. 
in the domestic transfer pricing regime. For instance, Indonesia applies a 25% 
shareholding threshold in its transfer pricing regime to determine if two parties are 
related. Consequently, each external comparable selected in a benchmarking study 
to test a related party transaction must not have 25% or more of its shares held by any 
one shareholder. This translates to an independence criterion of ‘B’ in databases 
commonly used for benchmarking purposes, such as the Osiris or Oriana databases. 
For another jurisdiction such as Japan whose shareholding threshold for the 
determination of related parties in its domestic jurisdiction is 50%, the independence 
criterion applied would be ‘A’, i.e. no single shareholder holds 50% or more of the 
enterprise’s shares. Where the related party transaction is one between an enterprise 
in Japan and another enterprise in Indonesia, care would have to be taken in the 
comparables search such that a ‘B’ criterion for independence is applied, even though 
from a Japan domestic tax perspective, companies with between 25% to 50% of its 
shares held by a single investor could still be treated as independent.  
Putting the situation above into the perspective of Competent Authority 
discussions under Articles 9 and 25 of the OECD Model, given the lack of guidance 
on the exact definition of associated enterprises, various points of contention can be 
envisaged. For example, consider the scenario where a Japanese entity were to own 
40% share capital of an Indonesian entity and the Indonesian tax authorities were to 
apply a transfer pricing adjustment to the transactions between the Indonesian entity 
and the Japanese entity. Assume taxpayers have filed for a mutual agreement 
procedure (MAP) between Indonesia and Japan. The Japanese Competent Authority 
could take the view point from their perspective that the transfer pricing adjustment 
should not be made. The Japanese and Indonesian entities could not be considered 
as associated enterprises under Article 9 of the OECD Model given that the Japanese 
entity did not own more than 50% of the Indonesian entity. The Indonesian Competent 
Authority would hold the view that the two entities are associated since the Japanese 
entity held more than 25% of the Indonesian entity. Assuming that both Competent 
Authorities agree to admit this case under MAP, the two authorities might continue to 
disagree in terms of the type of comparables that could be admitted for the purposes 
of benchmarking the tested entity. The Japanese Competent Authority might argue 
that only comparables with the BvD independence indicator of “A” can be admitted 
while the Indonesian Competent Authority might argue that comparables with the BvD 
independence indicators of “A” and “B” can be admitted. These issues of contention 
would detract both Competent Authorities from the main objective of eliminating 
economic double taxation between the two jurisdictions and finding the appropriate 
arm’s length outcome in the transactions between the two enterprises. 
Once again, the authors are of the view that greater clarity by the OECD in 
terms of the definition of “associated enterprises” would help to address the issue 
above on comparability. 
 
6.4. Country-by-country reporting 
The OECD developed a three-tiered standardised approach to transfer pricing 
documentation under BEPS Action 13. First, MNE are required to maintain a “master 
file” that can provide tax administrations with high-level information regarding their 
global business operations and transfer pricing policies. Second, a “local file” specific 
to each country is intended to provide details of the material related party transactions 
of the reporting entity, the amounts involved in those transactions and the reporting 
entity’s analysis of the transfer pricing determinations with regard to those 
transactions. Third, large MNEs may file a country-by-country (“CbC”) report 
containing information such as the amount of revenue, profit before income tax and 
taxes paid in each jurisdiction where the MNEs operate, as well as the location and 
main business of each constituent entity within the MNE group. These three 
documents (master file, local file and CbC report) are intended to lead taxpayers to 
articulate consistent transfer pricing positions. The documents will also provide tax 
administrations with useful information to assess transfer pricing risks, make 
determinations about where audit resources can be most effectively be deployed.91 
MNE groups are required to file CbC Report if their annual consolidated group 
revenue were to exceed EUR 750 million or its domestic equivalent. A constituent 
entity that is reported in the CbC Report refers to the separate business unit of an 
MNE group that is included in the consolidated financial statements of the MNE group 
for financial reporting purposes.92 Given that the CbC report forms part of the set of 
documentation that tax authorities can use for transfer pricing risk assessment 
purposes, this would potentially mean that tax authorities would interpret the 
constituent entities in the CbC Report, which has been identified based on financial 
accounting standards, as associated enterprises for transfer pricing purposes when 
they rely on the CbC Report to do their transfer pricing risk assessment. As mentioned 
in section 4.5 above, the authors are of the view that an issue would arise when the 
definition of related parties used for accounting disclosure purposes is used for tax 
reporting or even audit purposes. In the case of CbC reporting, tax authorities may 
end up with a slightly different pool of entities i.e. constituent entities versus associated 
enterprises for transfer pricing risk assessment. It is important that tax authorities 
recognize that the related parties disclosed in financial statements hold limited 
meaning from a tax perspective. If not, the authors are of the view that complications 
may arise. In particular, there is a danger that related parties as defined for financial 
reporting purposes may end up being wrongly identified as associated enterprises. If 
the tax authorities were to hold a different view on the appropriate transfer price that 
should be transacted between these entities, transfer pricing adjustments might result, 
for which, there might not be treaty protection. These entities may also be slapped 
with the need to prepare transfer pricing documentation etc.    
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As a focus area, the authors would like to re-emphasize the need for related 
party definitions between the OECD MTC and domestic transfer pricing regimes to be 
aligned. Where proxies are used to identify related parties/associated enterprises, as 
in the case of the CbC Report, the fact that a constituent entity may not be an 
associated enterprise/related party for tax purposes should be highlighted by the 
OECD to the implementing jurisdictions to avoid unnecessary complications and 
compliance costs to MNEs. 
 
6.5 “Closely related” concept under BEPS Action 7 
 The final report on preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent 
establishment status under BEPS Action 7, issued on 5 October 2015, recommended 
a number of changes to Article 5 of the OECD Model Convention including a tightening 
of the definition of an independent agent under Article 5(6). 
Specifically, when a “person acts exclusively or almost exclusively on behalf of 
one or more enterprises to which it is closely related” that person cannot be considered 
an independent agent under Article 5(6) with respect to that enterprise. For this 
purpose, the recommendations provide that a person is “closely related” to an 
enterprise if, based on all the facts and circumstances, one has control of the other or 
both are under the control of the same persons or enterprises. In any case, a person 
shall be considered to be closely related to an enterprise if one possesses directly or 
indirectly more than 50% of the beneficial interest in the other (or, in the case of a 
company, more than 50% of the aggregate vote and value of the company’s shares 
or of the beneficial equity interest in the company), or another person possesses 
directly or indirectly more than 50% of the beneficial interest (or, in the case of a 
company, more than 50% of the aggregate vote and value of the company’s shares 
or of the beneficial equity interest in the company) in the person and the enterprise. 
 We note that a “closely related” relationship as described in the 
preceding paragraph pertains to the identification of whether a person is an 
independent agent, and not to the definition of “associated enterprises” under Article 
9 of the OECD Model Convention. However, this use of a control test and stating a 
beneficial interest threshold as indicative of a closely related relationship could 
arguably bring in new factors for consideration in determining relatedness, as 
jurisdictions consider how to define the scope of related parties in their transfer pricing 
regimes. It also remains to be seen if such a concept may eventually be adopted in 
other Articles of the OECD Model Convention. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In international taxation, it is important that jurisdictions interpret their bilateral 
treaties in the same manner. This will reduce or even prevent disputes arising from 
different interpretation of the treaties. In respect of the topic of this paper, it is thus 
important that both jurisdictions adopt the same interpretation on the scope of 
associated enterprises. If one treaty partner were to read the term “associated 
enterprises” in a relatively restricted sense, while another country interprets the 
concept of “associated enterprises” in a broader sense, this may cause serious 
problems in the field of international taxation.93 
 
The authors agree with the conclusion drawn by Dwarkasing that there is a 
need to provide more clarity on the meaning of the term “associated enterprise”. This 
will facilitate interpretation and application of the associated enterprise article. The 
objective of elimination of economic double taxation will then be achieved. As 
expressed by the authors in earlier sections, Article 9 serves a specific purpose. It 
ensures that transactions between associated enterprises are conducted at arm’s 
length. Adjustments can be made by the first jurisdiction to ensure this outcome. 
Where economic double taxation results, it also provides the mechanism for the other 
jurisdiction to make adjustments and remove the economic double taxation. The 
context envisaged is definitely that of parents and subsidiaries or subsidiaries in the 
same group, transacting with each other cross border. This generally served the 
original intention of Article 9 i.e. to provide for profit allocation.  
 
Domestic TP legislation has a broader purpose. It is to ensure arm’s length 
behaviour in both a domestic and cross border context. Every jurisdiction can exercise 
its sovereign right to set its own rules to meet its specific objectives. Logically, it would 
neither be possible nor realistic to align the purpose of Article 9 together with how 
associated enterprises are defined in domestic TP legislation. In a cross border 
context, the real issue would tend to arise in the context of parents and subsidiaries 
or subsidiaries in the same group, and less so of other types of association as defined 
under domestic legislation e.g. by blood etc. From the authors’ perspective, while the 
domestic and international definitions of associated enterprises are not aligned, this 
would generally not be so critical. What matters is that countries interpret Article 9 and 
their obligation with consensus to ensure that the intended effect of the Article is 
achieved. That said, depending on the jurisdictions’ interpretations of their obligations 
under Article 25 of the OECD MTC, the authors would agree with Dwarkasing and 
argue that jurisdictions would already have the duty or avenue to deal with cases of 
economic double taxation that arise. As mentioned in the commentary to Article 
25(1)94, whether or not the actions of one or both of the Contracting States will result 
in taxation not in accordance with the Convention must be determined from the 
perspective of the taxpayer. Where the domestic and international definitions of 
associated enterprises are not aligned, taxpayers may be in a situation where double 
taxation results. Consequently, an MAP for both states to resolve this difference can 
be triggered under Article 25(1). If both states subsequently take the position that 
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nothing can be done under Article 25(1) on the premise that it does not come under 
the scope of the OECD MTC based on their interpretation of the Articles in the OECD 
MTC, a case could be made under Article 25(3) for both states to try to resolve the 
double taxation even if both States regard that the situation falls out of the OECD 
MTC.95 Nonetheless, the use of Article 25(3) to resolve such issues should be the 
exception more than the norm. The clarification of the scope of Article 9 should be the 
preferred solution.   
 
 Given the increasing focus on transfer pricing, it is anticipated that more transfer 
pricing disputes can be expected. With it, there would likely be greater use of Articles 
9 and 25 to eliminate economic double taxation that may arise. This intensifies the 
need for clarity on the scope of Article 9. While the authors are convinced of the original 
intended scope of Article 9, it would also be timely to review the scope in light of the 
changes that would be made to the transfer pricing guidelines. The authors do not 
advocate expanding the scope of Article 9. However, some slight changes may be 
necessary to cater for the changes in business models and the way business is carried 
out between enterprises. As mentioned, the authors would reiterate and caution 
against the tendency to lump these changes with the solution for tax avoidance or 
evasion. These should be addressed separately and not be muddled with the scope 
of Article 9. 
 
 
  
                                                          
95  OECD, op. cit., Commentary to Article 25 para 55. 
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Appendix 1 
Summary of the definition of related parties / associated enterprises in the transfer pricing regime of 
selected jurisdictions96  
Country Definition of related parties / associated enterprises in the transfer pricing 
regime 
Australia The Australia transfer pricing regime is applicable if an Australian entity gets a 
transfer pricing benefit in Australia from cross-border conditions that are 
inconsistent with the arm’s length principle. 
 
Where there is a relevant tax treaty to the cross border transaction, the 
Australia transfer pricing legislation makes reference to the Associated 
Enterprises Article of the tax treaty in determining if there is a transfer pricing 
benefit. 
 
However, note that there is a requirement to disclose ‘international related 
parties’ in the International dealings schedule 2016 (NAT 73345), which forms 
part of your entity's tax return. 
'International related parties' means an interest in equity, voting rights, or 
income distribution of 20% or more. 
International related parties are persons who are not dealing wholly 
independently with one another in their commercial or financial relations and 
whose dealings or relations can be subject to Subdivision 815-B of the ITAA 
1997 or the associated enterprises article of a relevant tax treaty.  
The term includes: 
 Any overseas entity or person who participates directly or indirectly in the 
person’s management, control or capital; 
 Any overseas entity or person in respect of which the person participates 
directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital; or 
 Any overseas entity or person in respect of which persons who participate 
directly or indirectly in its management, control or capital are the same 
persons who participate directly or indirectly in the person’s management, 
control or capital. 
 
(Source: Section 815.15 and Section 815.120, Income Tax Assessment Act 1997) 
Belgium Two parties are related if one of them participates directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or share capital of the other or if a third party or third 
parties participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or share 
capital of both parties. 
 
However, note that the Royal Decree of 10 August 2009 requires corporations 
to report non-arm’s length transactions with related parties, making reference 
to the International Accounting Standard 24 for the definition of related 
parties. 
 
(Source: Article 26 of the Belgian Income Tax Code 
Royal Decree of 10 August 2009) 
China An enterprise is related to another enterprise, organization or individual if: 
                                                          
96 Information provided in the summary table is based on the sources indicated as assessed on 1 July 2016. 
 One party holds directly or indirectly at least 25% shares of the other party, 
or a third party holds directly or indirectly at least 25% shares of both 
parties; 
 One party holds the shares of the other party through an intermediary, as 
long as that party holds at least 25% of the shares of the intermediary, the 
percentage by which that party holds the shares of the other party is the 
same as that of the intermediary’s shareholding of the other party; 
 Two or more natural persons are related by marriage, lineage, are siblings 
and other financially dependent relations, and jointly hold shares of the 
same enterprise, their shareholding percentage are combined to determine 
the aggregate shareholding percentage; 
 The total debts owed by one party to the other party exceed 50% of either 
party’s paid-up capital, or at least 10% of the total debts owed by one party 
is guaranteed by the other party, with the exception of an independent 
financial institution without a controlling relationship; 
 One party’s operational activity is dependent on intangibles provided by 
the other party, e.g. patents, non-patented technology, trademarks, 
copyrights, etc.; 
 The purchases, sales, provision of services, receipt of services or other 
business activities are controlled by the other party, where control refers to 
the right of one party to make decisions on the other party’s financial and 
operational strategies, so as to benefit from the other party’s business 
operations; 
 More than half of one party’s directors or senior management personnel, 
including a public listed company’s secretary of the board, manager, deputy 
manager, finance chief or other personnel according to a company’s 
articles of incorporation, are appointed or assigned by the other party, or 
who concurrently hold a directorship or senior management position of the 
other party; or two parties each with more than half of their directors or 
senior management personnel being appointed or assigned by the third 
party; 
 Where the relationship between two parties satisfies any one of the 
definitions stated in the points above, and so does the relationship 
between each party and another natural person that is related by marriage, 
lineage, sibling relationship or other financially dependent relationship; or 
 The two parties have other substantial common interests. 
 
(Source: Bulletin of the State Administration of Taxation [2016] No. 42) 
Canada Paragraph 251(1)(a) deems that related persons do not deal with each other at 
arm’s length, regardless of how they actually conduct their mutual business 
transactions.  
 
 Individuals connected by blood relationship, marriage, common-law 
partnership or adoption; or 
 A corporation with another person where: (a) that person controls the 
corporation; (b) that person is a member of a related group that controls 
the corporation; or (c) that person is a person who is related to a person 
described in (a) or (b) above; or 
 Two corporations are related if: (i) the two corporations are controlled by 
the same person or group of persons; (ii) each of the corporations is 
controlled by one person and the person who controls one corporation is 
related to the person who controls the other corporation; (iii) one of the 
corporations is controlled by one person and that person is related to any 
member of a related group that controls the other corporation; (iv) one of 
the corporations is controlled by one person and that person is related to 
each member of an unrelated group that controls the other corporation; (v) 
any member of a related group that controls one of the corporations is 
related to each member of an unrelated group that controls the other 
corporation; or (vi) each member of an unrelated group that controls one 
of the corporations is related to at least one member of an unrelated group 
that controls the other corporation. 
 
(Source: Subsection 251(2) of the Income Tax Act) 
France Associated enterprises are those that depend on or control enterprises outside 
France.  
 
Dependence can be either de jure or de facto. Furthermore, there is no need to 
prove the relationship of dependence or control in respect of profit transfers to 
enterprises located in a foreign jurisdiction that has a preferential tax regime.  
 
There is de jure dependence if a French enterprise is dependent on a foreign 
enterprise through share capital or voting rights, or if the foreign enterprise has 
the authority to perform functions that include decision-making, either directly 
or indirectly through intermediaries.  
 
There is de facto dependence resulting from commercial relationships, e.g. 
dependence through personnel or equipment of the foreign enterprise. De 
facto dependence has been ruled in numerous case laws. 
 
(Source: Section 57 General Tax Code) 
Germany  A person holds, directly or indirectly, a participation of at least 25% in the 
other person’s capital, or has direct or collateral possibility to exert a 
dominating influence to the related party; or 
 A 3rd person holds, directly or indirectly, a participation of at least 25% in 
both in that person’s and the other person’s capital, or exerts indirectly or 
collaterally a dominating influence. 
 
 (Source: Section 1 paragraph 2 of the Foreign Tax Act (Außensteuergesetz)) 
India Two enterprises are associated enterprises if: 
 One enterprise participates, directly or indirectly, or through one or more 
intermediaries, in the management or control or capital of the other 
enterprise; or  
 In respect of which one or more persons who participate, directly or 
indirectly, or through one or more intermediaries, in its management or 
control or capital, are the same persons who participate, directly or 
indirectly, or through one or more intermediaries, in the management or 
control or capital of the other enterprise.  
 
In addition, two enterprises are deemed associated enterprises if, at any time 
during the previous year: 
 One enterprise holds, directly or indirectly, shares carrying at least 26% of 
the voting power in the other enterprise;  
 Any person or enterprise holds, directly or indirectly, shares carrying at 
least 26% of the voting power in each of such enterprises; 
 A loan advanced by one enterprise to the other enterprise constitutes at 
least 51% of the book value of the total assets of the other enterprise; 
 One enterprise guarantees at least 10% of the total borrowings of the other 
enterprise;  
 More than half of the board of directors or members of the governing 
board, or one or more executive directors or executive members of the 
governing board of one enterprise, are appointed by the other enterprise;  
 More than half of the directors or members of the governing board, or one 
or more of the executive directors or members of the governing board, of 
each of the two enterprises are appointed by the same person or persons; 
 The manufacture or processing of goods or articles or business carried out 
by one enterprise is wholly dependent on the use of know-how, patents, 
copyrights, trademarks, licences, franchises or any other business or 
commercial rights of similar nature, or any data, documentation, drawing 
or specification relating to any patent, invention, model, design, secret 
formula or process, of which the other enterprise is the owner or in respect 
of which the other enterprise has exclusive rights;  
 At least 90% of the raw materials and consumables required for the 
manufacture or processing of goods or articles carried out by one 
enterprise, are supplied by the other enterprise, or by persons specified by 
the other enterprise, and the prices and other conditions relating to the 
supply are influenced by such other enterprise;  
 The goods or articles manufactured or processed by one enterprise, are 
sold to the other enterprise or to persons specified by the other enterprise, 
and the prices and other conditions relating thereto are influenced by such 
other enterprise;  
 Where one enterprise is controlled by an individual, the other enterprise is 
also controlled by such individual or his relative or jointly by such individual 
and relative of such individual;  
 Where one enterprise is controlled by a Hindu undivided family, the other 
enterprise is controlled by a member of such Hindu undivided family or by a 
relative of a member of such Hindu undivided family or jointly by such 
member and his relative;  
 Where one enterprise is a firm, association of persons or body of 
individuals, the other enterprise holds at least 10% interest in such firm, 
association of persons or body of individuals; or  
 There exists between the two enterprises, any relationship of mutual 
interest, as may be prescribed. 
 
(Source: Section 92A, Chapter X, Income Tax Act 1961) 
Indonesia Related parties are deemed to exist: 
 Where a taxpayer directly or indirectly participates in at least 25% of the 
capital of another taxpayer; 
 Where a company participates in at least 25% of the capital of two 
taxpayers, in which case the latter two taxpayers are also considered to be 
related; 
 Where a taxpayer directly or indirectly controls another taxpayer or where 
two or more taxpayers are under common control; or 
 Where there is a family relationship by blood or marriage. 
 
(Source: Article 18 Income Tax Law) 
Ireland  Two persons are associated if one person participates in the management, 
control or capital of the other person, or if a third person participates in the 
management, control or capital of each of the two persons. A person is deemed 
to be participating in the management, control or capital of another person if 
that other person is a company and is controlled by the first person. A company 
is treated as controlled by an individual if it is controlled by the individual and 
persons connected with the individual, i.e. a relative of that individual. 
 
(Source: Section 835B of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (as inserted by 
Section 42 of the Finance Act 2010)) 
Japan A foreign-related person is a foreign corporation that has: 
 At least 50% holding in the total number of issued shares or amount of 
investment; or 
 A special relationship, which includes situations where: 
o 50% or more of the officers of the company are or were employees 
or officers of the other company 
o The representative director of the company is or was an employee 
or officer of the other company; 
o A considerable proportion of a company’s operating transactions 
are with the other company; or  
o A considerable proportion of a company’s outstanding loans, which 
are necessary to the company’s operations, have been borrowed 
from or guaranteed by the other company. 
 
(Source: Article 39-12 Cabinet Order on the Special Taxation Measures Law) 
Luxembourg When an enterprise participates, directly or indirectly, in the management, 
control or capital of another enterprise, or where the same individuals 
participate, directly or indirectly, in the management, control or capital of two 
enterprises and where, in either instance, the two enterprises are, within their 
commercial or financial relations subject to conditions made or imposed which 
differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, the 
profits of these enterprises are to be determined under conditions prevailing 
between independent enterprises and taxed in consequence. 
 
(Source: Article 56 Luxembourg Income Tax Law) 
Malaysia Where a corporation – 
 Is the holding company of another corporation; 
 Is a subsidiary of another corporation; or 
 Is a subsidiary of the holding company of another corporation, 
The corporation and that other corporation are deemed to be related. 
 
Where –  
 Two or more companies are related within the meaning above; 
 A company is so related to another company which is itself so related to a 
third company; 
 The same persons hold more than 50% of the shares in each of two or more 
companies; or  
 Each of two or more companies is so related to at least one of two or more 
companies that the preceding point applies, 
all the companies in question are considered the same group. 
 
(Source: Companies Act 1965, Section 6 
Income Tax Act 1967, Subsection 2(4)) 
Netherlands  Where an entity participates, directly or indirectly, in the management, 
control or capital of another entity, and conditions are made or imposed 
between these entities in their commercial and financial relations (transfer 
prices) which differ from conditions which would be made between 
independent parties, the profit of these entities will be determined as if the 
last mentioned conditions were made.  
 The paragraph above will also be applicable, when the same person 
participates, directly or indirectly, in the management, control or capital of 
both the first and second entity. 
 
(Source: Article 8b, paragraph 1 Wet op de Vennootschapsbelasting 1969 
(Corporate Income Tax Law)) 
New Zealand The definition of associated persons in New Zealand’s Income Tax Act is 
extensively worded and includes relationships between companies, between a 
company and a person other than a company, between two relatives, etc. The 
definition is applied for the purposes of the whole Act unless specifically stated 
otherwise, i.e. it is applied under New Zealand’s transfer pricing regime.  
 
In the case of companies, two companies are considered associated if:  
 A group of persons exists whose total voting interests in each company are 
50% or more; 
 a market value circumstance exists for either company; and a group of 
persons exists whose total market value interests in each company are 50% 
or more; or 
 A group of persons exists who control both companies by any other means. 
 
(Source: Section YB, Income Tax Act 2007 No 97) 
Singapore A related party, in relation to a person, means any other person who, directly 
or indirectly, controls that person, or is controlled, directly or indirectly, by that 
person, or where he and that other person, directly or indirectly, are under the 
control of a common person. 
 
(Source: Section 13(16) Income Tax Act) 
South Korea  Either party to a transaction owns directly or indirectly at least 50% of the 
voting shares (including the equity shares; hereinafter the same shall 
apply) of the other party; 
 Both parties to a transaction, where a third party owns directly or 
indirectly at least 50% of their respective voting shares; 
 Parties to a transaction have common interests through an investment in 
capital, a transaction of goods or service, a grant of loan, etc. and either 
party to a transaction has power to actually make a decision on the 
business policy of the other party; or 
 Both parties to a transaction, where the parties to the transaction have 
common interests through an investment in capital, a transaction of goods 
or service, a grant of loan, etc. and a third party has power to actually 
make a decision on the business policies of both parties. 
 
(Source: Article 2 International Tax Coordination Law) 
 
Switzerland Switzerland does not have specific transfer pricing legislation and adheres to 
the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines including its updates. In an instruction 
issued on 4 March 1997, the Director of the Swiss Federal Tax Administration 
informed the cantonal tax authorities about the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines and asked that the guidelines are observed when adjusting profits or 
when assessing multinational enterprises in the respective canton. 
Thailand “Associated companies or juristic partnerships” means two or more companies 
or juristic partnerships having any of the following relationships: 
 More than one half of the same shareholders or partners in a juristic 
person constitutes more than a half of the number of the shareholders or 
partners in another juristic person; 
 The shareholders or partners holding more than 50% of the value of the 
total capital of a juristic person are also the shareholders or partners 
holding more than 50% of the value of the total capital of another juristic 
person; 
 A juristic person is a shareholder or partner holding more than 50% of the 
value of the total capital of another juristic person; or 
 Persons constituting more than one half of the number of the directors or 
partners controls the management of a juristic person and are also 
directors or partners who control the management of another juristic 
person. 
 
(Source: Section 38_64 Revenue Code) 
United 
Kingdom 
The “participation condition” is met, namely: 
 One party directly or indirectly participates in the management, control or 
capital of the other, or a 3rd party participates in the management, control 
capital of the two parties; or 
 40% test of control for joint ventures; or 
 Persons acting together to exert control in relation to financing 
arrangements. 
 
(Source:  
Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010, Part 4 
Corporation Tax Act 2010, Section 1124) 
United States  Any 25% foreign shareholder of the reporting corporation; 
 Any person who is related to the reporting corporation or to a 25% foreign 
shareholder of the reporting corporation. In this regard, the Act includes 
the following situations as relatedness: 
o Members of a family, as defined in subsection; 
o An individual and a corporation more than 50% in value of the 
outstanding stock of which is owned, directly or indirectly, by or for 
such individual; 
o Two corporations which are members of the same controlled group; 
o A grantor and a fiduciary of any trust; 
o A fiduciary of a trust and a fiduciary of another trust, if the same 
person is a grantor of both trusts; 
o fiduciary of a trust and a beneficiary of such trust; 
o A fiduciary of a trust and a beneficiary of another trust, if the same 
person is a grantor of both trusts; 
o A fiduciary of a trust and a corporation more than 50% in value of the 
outstanding stock of which is owned, directly or indirectly, by or for the 
trust or by or for a person who is a grantor of the trust; 
o A person and an organization to which section 501 (relating to certain 
educational and charitable organizations exempt from tax) applies and 
which is controlled directly or indirectly by such person or, if such 
person is an individual, by members of the family of such individual; 
o A corporation and a partnership if the same persons own - 
 (A) more than 50 percent in value of the outstanding stock of the 
corporation, and 
 (B) more than 50% of the capital interest, or the profits interest, in the 
partnership; 
o An S corporation and another S corporation if the same persons own 
more than 50% in value of the outstanding stock of each corporation; 
o An S corporation and a C corporation, if the same persons own more 
than 50% in value of the outstanding stock of each corporation; or 
o Except in the case of a sale or exchange in satisfaction of a pecuniary 
bequest, an executor of an estate and a beneficiary of such estate; or 
 Any other person who is related within the meaning of section 482 to the 
reporting corporation. Section 482 describes the case of two or more 
organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether 
or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned 
or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests. 
 
(Source: Section 6038A Internal Revenue Code 
Section 267B Internal Revenue Code 
Section 482 Internal Revenue Code) 
Vietnam Parties shall be considered parties having associated relations (below collective) 
referred to as associated parties in any of the following cases: 
 One party directly or indirectly participates in the management or control 
of, contribution of capital to or investment in any form in the other party; 
 The parties are directly or indirectly subject to the management or control 
of, contribution of capital to, or investment in any form, by another party; 
or 
 The parties directly or indirectly participate in the management or control 
of, contribution of capital to, or investment in any form in another party. 
 
Normally, two enterprises shall be considered associated in a tax period if 
during such period: 
 One enterprise directly or indirectly holds at least 20% of investment 
capital of the other enterprise;  
 A third party directly or indirectly holds at least 20% of investment capital 
of both enterprises;  
 Both enterprises directly or indirectly hold at least 20% of investment 
capital of a third party;  
 One enterprise is the biggest shareholder regarding investment capital of 
the other enterprise, directly or indirectly holding at least 10% of 
investment capital of the other enterprise;  
 One enterprise guarantees or gives to the other enterprise loans in any 
form on the condition that such loans account for at least 20% of 
investment capital of the borrowing enterprise and account for over 50% of 
the total value of medium term and long term loans of the borrowing 
enterprise;  
 More than 50% of total members of the board of executive directors or 
total members of the control board of one enterprise are appointed by the 
other enterprise or one executive director or one member of the control 
board of one enterprise who has power to decide on financial policies or 
business activities of the other enterprise is appointed by the other 
enterprise;  
 More than 50% of members of the board of directors or a member of the 
board of directors who has power to decide on financial policies or business 
activities of each of the two enterprises are appointed by the same third 
party;  
 The two enterprises are managed or controlled in personnel, financial and 
business affairs by individuals being members of a family who have 
relations of husband and wife, parent and child (whether natural, adopted 
children or children-in law); siblings of the same parent (whether natural or 
adoptive parent), grandparent and grandchild of the same blood line, aunt 
or uncle and niece or nephew of the same blood line;  
 The two enterprises have the relationship of head office and resident 
establishment or are resident establishments of the same foreign 
organization or individual; 
 One enterprise manufactures or trades in products using intangible assets 
and/or intellectual property rights of the other enterprise for which it has 
to make a payment accounting for over 50% of historical cost (or cost price) 
of such products;  
 Over 50% of the total value of raw materials, materials, supplies or input 
products (exclusive of fixed asset depreciation expenses) used by one 
enterprise for manufacturing or trading in output products are supplied by 
the other enterprise;  
 Over 50% of products (calculated for each kind of product) sold by one 
enterprise is directly or indirectly controlled by the other enterprise; or 
 The two enterprises have reached a business cooperation agreement on a 
contractual basis. 
 
(Source: Circular 66/2010/TT-BTC) 
 
